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The Twin Demons of the TrumpBannon Assault on Democracy
Executive Summary
In the early days of his administration, President Donald Trump signed two
executive orders directed at changing the regulatory process. One order is
intended to reduce the cost of regulation. Its fatal flaw, however, is that it
neglects to account for regulatory benefits. The second order is intended to
reform the regulatory process. Its fatal flaw is that it adds useless costs to the
process rather than reducing them. The fear about both orders is that they
will roll back a range of existing environmental, health, and safety
protections while blocking the development of future beneficial rules.
Together, the executive orders constitute a double-barreled assault not just
on the “administrative state” that White House strategist Steve Bannon has
promised to “deconstruct,” but on the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act,
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and other landmark laws regardless of
the diseases they prevent, lives they save, pollution they curb or mitigate,
and the other benefits they produce. In exchange, the orders may well
hobble the regulatory process itself with new layers of review, making it
more difficult for regulatory agencies to devote resources to enforce existing
laws.
Shortly after the cost-reduction executive order was issued, Public Citizen,
the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Communications Workers of
America joined in challenging it in court. Their complaint identifies several
causes of action, including the charge that the order violates the
constitutional direction to the president to “take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,” as well as several statutory directives. The complaint
goes on to cite a number of proposed rules that, if eliminated by the order,
would frustrate enabling legislation passed by Congress. For example, the
Motor Vehicle Safety Act’s purpose is to “reduce traffic accidents and deaths
and injuries” from traffic accidents, and as the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration implements the law, it must consider a range of
relevant information on whether a proposed standard is reasonable,
practicable, and appropriate. The law does not designate that costs alone be
the determining factor.

Together, the
executive orders
constitute a
double-barreled
assault on the
Clean Water Act,
Clean Air Act,
Occupational
Safety and Health
Act, and other
landmark laws.

The lawsuit highlights at least three infirmities in the executive order. First,
the elimination of regulations must comply with statutory and constitutional
procedures. Regulations cannot be eliminated by executive fiat. Second,
regulatory reductions cannot be done indiscriminately; instead, regulatory
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benefits must be considered as a matter of established law. Indeed, specific
legislation mandates consideration of benefits, and Supreme Court case law
acknowledges the need to do so. Third, fundamental principles of
democracy require government to act for the public benefit. These
constitutional and political obligations are not only ignored, they are
affirmatively and aggressively rejected by the executive order.
This last requirement — that government must act for the public benefit —
has a long history in the United States. Over the decades, the government
has gone through a number of regulatory cycles, from mercantilism to
laissez-faire capitalism and from progressivism to deregulation. During those
cycles, the issue has never been about the presence or absence of
regulation. Instead, the central issue was how to use government regulation
to maximize the common good, to maximize social benefits.

The requirement
that government
must act for the
public benefit
has a long history
in the United
States.

The growth of the regulatory state raised concerns on both sides of the
political aisle. Beginning with President Jimmy Carter’s administration,
politicians and policymakers began to question the extent of regulation and,
in fact, began to deregulate. The Carter administration deregulated airlines,
trucking, energy, and the financial sector, among others. The deregulatory
mood became more visible with the election of Ronald Reagan. During his
administration, deregulation continued, and the Regan Revolution became
synonymous with deregulation across the board.
But even as regulation has ebbed and flowed, it has always been the case
that rules do not indiscriminately impose costs on blameless actors.
Regulations protecting children from lead poisoning may well impose costs;
so do clean air regulations directed to power plants to reduce greenhouse
gas pollution. However, those compliance costs are a necessary corrective to
market forces that would otherwise encourage individuals and businesses to
externalize the harmful consequences of their actions or products as much
as possible. Instead of simply imposing costs on bad actors, regulations
require the responsible market actors to account for the harms that they
have inflicted on the public. Regulation, then, is intended to avoid those
harms in the first place rather than impose them on innocent persons.
Polluters should not profit from causing asthma or heart disease. Regulation
or its reduction is not intended to reward malfeasants; it is intended to
provide compensation, avoid harm, and promote public welfare.
In some instances, agencies are permitted (and sometimes required) to use
cost-benefit analysis. However, they may not do so in violation of
congressional direction. Indeed, no less a conservative than Justice Antonin
Scalia made the case that when a law directs an agency to set standards
using some particular measure of regulatory analysis other than costs and
benefits, the law means what it says. Consequently, the executive order’s
singular focus on regulatory costs cuts against decades of Supreme Court
precedent.
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In a complementary way, just as the benefits of regulation must be
acknowledged, the costs of failing to regulate properly or not regulate at all
are a matter of life and death, as the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, the
Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, and the Big Short mortgage debacle all
demonstrate. In these and other instances, the failure to regulate results is
the privatization of benefits and the socialization of costs. Homeowners, not
bankers, suffered the most severe losses due to the lack of financial
regulation, and mine workers and oil and gas workers, not CEOs, lost their
lives for the failure to aggressively pursue safety regulations. Because the
intent of these executive orders is to reduce regulation, agencies will, at the
very least, be discouraged, if not thwarted, from enacting new beneficial
regulations.
The executive orders have the seemingly reasonable goal of reducing
regulatory costs. Their devilish methods of doing so, however, are fraught
with difficulties, including that they ignore constitutional and statutory
requirements and run contrary to good government practices and policies.

The costs of
failing to regulate
properly or not
regulate at all are
a matter of life
and death, as the
BP Deepwater
Horizon disaster,
the Upper Big
Branch Mine
disaster, and the
Big Short
mortgage
debacle all
demonstrate.
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Demon 1

The better the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven
there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb.
The values of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an
unjust law. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due
process will be meticulously observed.
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977)

Demon 2

ROPER: So now you’d give the Devil benefit of law?
MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the
law to get after the Devil?
ROPER: I cut down every law in England to do that!
MORE: And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you — where would you hide, Roper, the laws all
being flat? This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to
coast . . . and if you cut them down . . . d’you really think you
could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?
ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 37-38 (1962)
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Introduction
On January 30, 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order
"Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs."1 Then, on February
24, he signed an executive order on “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform
Agenda.”2 Together these two executive orders constitute a severe threat to
American society and the American economy. In the words of Stephen
Bannon, Trump’s chief strategist, they represent a plan for “the
deconstruction of the administrative state.”3
The purpose of the administrative state can be most simply stated this way:
Unless otherwise stated in the enabling legislation, government regulation
makes sense when the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs of
compliance. As this paper demonstrates, social benefits consistently
outweigh regulatory costs, and the regulatory state is responsive to the
needs and wishes of the American people; regulation is a response to our
democratic impulse. Thus, the regulatory state honors our historical and
traditional constitutional values. The Trump executive orders ignore these
fundamental principles. Instead of promoting the public good, they risk
making it increasingly difficult, and sometimes politically impossible, to issue
new rules that might be regarded as discretionary in nature. Instead, the
espoused purpose of these orders is to end regulation full stop and, in the
process, deny millions of Americans the benefits of government and wreak
havoc on the economy.4
By doing so, the White House ignores the will of Congress; it ignores
directives from the United States Supreme Court; and it deserts the
American public. Simply, the order to eliminate regulations has the effect
noted by both Thomas More in the above quotation and by Chief Justice
Burger in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978): It runs the risk of flattening the
laws and cutting them down to the disadvantage of the public good. The
order regarding so-called regulatory reform has the effect noted by Grant
Gilmore: it is intended to increase regulatory oversight to the point at which
due process is meticulously observed and the regulatory process crumbles
of its own weight.

Social benefits of
regulation
consistently
outweigh
regulatory costs,
and the
regulatory state is
responsive to the
needs and wishes
of the American
people;
regulation is a
response to our
democratic
impulse.

Demon 1: Regulatory Review
The executive order on regulatory review states that it is the policy of the
United States to alleviate unnecessary regulatory burdens. Not so ironically,
the order then goes on to create another layer of regulation by requiring
each agency to establish a Regulatory Reform Task Force. The purpose of the
task force is to review regulations and “make recommendations to the
agency head regarding their repeal, replacement, or modification, consistent
with applicable law.” At §3(d). Notice the directive does not include
continuing regulations or expanding them. Rather, it is a one-way ratchet
downward.

The Twin Demons of the Trump-Bannon Assault on Democracy | 5

The Task Force will be run by a Regulatory Reform Officer (RRO) and is
required, “at a minimum,” to identify regulations that eliminate jobs, are
outdated or ineffective, impose costs that exceed benefits, and create
inconsistencies with existing regulatory reform initiatives, among other
requirements. In carrying out its obligations, the Task Force must also
consult with various entities, including states, local and tribal governments,
small businesses, consumers, non-governmental organizations, and trade
associations.

The executive
order on
regulatory reform
does not
streamline the
regulatory
process, it adds
redundancies.

On the surface, regulatory review and the elimination of ineffective rules
make sense. What is problematic with the new executive order, however, is
that it is simply adding another layer of review to those that already exist.5
Consider: (1) the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to review every
rule that has “a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of
small entities” within 10 years after the final rule is published; (2) Executive
Order 12866 requires agencies to develop a program “under which the
agency will periodically review its existing significant regulations to
determine whether any such regulations should be modified or eliminated”;
and (3) Executive Order 13563 establishes a more elaborate program for
agencies to review their existing regulations and adds time-consuming and
resource-intensive procedures for carrying out reviews.
Further, some regulatory reviews are already part of enabling legislation.
The Clean Air Act, as an example, directs the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to “complete a thorough review” of the agency’s existing
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs) and “to make such
revisions…as may be appropriate” at least once every five years. In addition
to those reviews, consider the fact that regulations are proposed,
commented on, and analyzed within individual agencies. In other words,
proposed rules are critically examined and analyzed internally. Then, the
White House, through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) also conducts
assessments of those regulations.
The executive order on regulatory review does not streamline the regulatory
process, it adds redundancies. The Trump-Bannon game plan for the
regulatory process is clear. Hire Grant Gilmore’s Demon 1 and through more
and more process, obfuscate, do not facilitate, regulation. Demon 1 is bad; it
tries to kill the regulatory state. Demon 2, though, is the worse of two evils; it
denies citizens the benefits of government.
Demon 2: Regulatory Cost Reduction
Let’s start with a consensus point: Wasteful, redundant, or otherwise
ineffective regulations should be eliminated. Effective regulations, however,
confer demonstrable benefits on society and, therefore, must be sustained.6
The cost reduction executive order does not distinguish between effective
and ineffective regulations. Instead, it requires that two existing regulations
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be eliminated for every new one that is adopted. The express point behind
the order is, of course, the elimination of regulations. As discussed in more
detail below, the executive order focuses only on costs, not on benefits. The
narrow focus on costs alone means that using Trump logic, employers
would never compensate employees because salary is simply a cost on the
books and, therefore, must be a drag on business. The logic is there, but
reason is not.
Certainly, new presidential administrations have the legitimate authority, if
not the electoral obligation, to put their political and policy preferences into
practice and into law. That authority, however, is not limitless and cannot be
exercised without constraints. Rather, White House efforts to reduce
regulation must be done according to law. More particularly, constitutional
requirements, statutory directives, and basic good government practices
impose legal and political obligations on the exercise of White House power.
Although guidance documents exist regarding the elimination of
regulations, they do not suggest any constraints on the exercise of that
power. Instead, they address procedural issues such as the scope of
coverage7 and how cost-benefit analysis should be applied.8 Neither the
executive order nor the guidance documents address either the substance
or priorities regarding the types of regulations that should be eliminated.
Consequently, elimination will be left to the political and policy preferences
of an administration that has already exhibited its disdain for the public
good perhaps best exemplified by what has been called an “immoral”
“reverse Robin Hood” budget that literally takes from the poor and gives to
the rich.9
The singular focus on regulatory cost-cutting presents a triple threat. First, as
noted, social benefits will be severely discounted or eliminated. Second, the
executive orders provide incentives for agencies to not act because they add
regulatory requirements, burdens, and delays. As a direct consequence,
doing nothing reduces social benefits. And, third, the reduction process will
be selective and highly politicized. For example, possible federal budget
cuts include such conservative targets as the EPA, Medicaid, health
insurance for children, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Legal
Services Corporation, the National Endowment for the Arts, the National
Endowment for the Humanities, and the Export-Import Bank, among others,
regardless of the negligible effect these entities have on the budget.10 This
cost reduction platform is more than partisan antagonism toward
regulation. Rather, it is an ideology of destruction all the way down.

Presidential
authority is not
limitless and
cannot be
exercised without
constraints.
Rather, White
House efforts to
reduce regulation
must be done
according to law.

The order, therefore, is fatally flawed because it violates established law as
well as established principles of our constitutional order. It also violates
fundamental principles of our modern government. Combined, these legal
violations have one costly consequence — since numerous regulations will
all lay flat, citizens, consumers, and the economy as a whole will suffer.
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Because the order is silent on regulatory benefits, those benefits will be lost.
As explicitly noted by the Congressional Research Service, “measuring costs
without also considering benefits does not provide the context for
evaluating the appropriateness of the country’s amount of regulation.”11
Benefits matter. Benefits matter as required by constitutional law, statutory
and regulatory law, and fundamental good government policy.

The complaint
carefully and
usefully provides
numerous
examples of
proposed rules
that if eliminated
by the executive
order would
frustrate enabling
legislation.

The Public Citizen Complaint
This white paper opposes the January 30 cost reduction executive order and
is supportive of a recently filed lawsuit seeking to stop it before harm is
imposed. Shortly after the order was signed, a complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief was filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia by two public interest organizations and a labor union (Public
Citizen, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Communications
Workers of America).12 The complaint sets out several causes of action,
including the charge that the executive order violates the U.S. Constitution,
Art. II, §3, which states that the president “take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed”; violates various specific statutory directives; and
expressly and detrimentally ignores regulatory benefits in contravention of
sound government, existing law, and public policy.
The complaint carefully and usefully provides numerous examples of
proposed rules that, if eliminated by the executive order, would frustrate
enabling legislation. As one example, the complaint notes that the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act was enacted “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and
injuries resulting from traffic accidents.” 49 U.S.C. § 30101. In so regulating,
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA) must consider a
range of relevant information regarding whether a proposed standard is
reasonable, practicable, and appropriate. The statute does not designate
costs alone as the determining factor; otherwise, any regulation that
imposes costs would be subject to elimination.
The complaint also notes that a proposed rule requiring speed limiting
devices on motor vehicles has estimated benefits of $500 million to
$5 billion annually, including fuel savings and the prevention of thousands
of traffic injuries and deaths. The installation costs of such a rule would be
minimal but impose social costs from lower speed limits of $200 million to
$1.5 billion annually. Thus, even accounting for social costs, the benefits
significantly outweigh costs; yet, pursuant to the executive order, costs
alone will be assessed to determine whether or not the proposed rule goes
forward.
As another example, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) is based on
congressional findings that “human beings and the environment are being
exposed each year to a large number of chemical substances and mixtures”
that “may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment.” 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a). The statute then directs the administrator
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of the EPA to evaluate existing chemicals under a risk-based safety standard
“without consideration of costs or other nonrisk factors.” Id. §§ 2604(b)(4)(A),
(f). On the face of the statute, then, the executive order would appear to be
inapplicable. However, because the executive order and its guidance
documents13 allow for cost trading among agencies, it is impossible to
predict how the costs of TSCA will be counted and assessed for the
elimination of other regulations in other departments and agencies.
Under TSCA, the EPA proposed two rules to phase out trichloroethylene
(TCE), a highly toxic volatile organic compound used in vapor degreasing,
aerosol degreasing, and spot cleaning in dry cleaning facilities. The EPA
estimates that one rule will impose costs of $30 million to $45 million
annually but have net benefits (including health protection benefits) of $35
million to $402 million annually. The EPA estimates that the other rule will
impose costs of $170,000 annually but have annual net benefits of $9 million
to $24.6 million. Once again, because the executive order focuses only on
costs, if the rules are eliminated, then multi-million dollar losses will be
imposed on society because social and economic benefits were ignored.
The complaint against the order specifies other examples of lost benefits
under such legislation as the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Mine
Safety and Health Act, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, and the
Endangered Species Act. Additionally, in its discussion of the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act, the complaint specifies that the executive order
precludes cost savings by frustrating cost-saving regulations. By ignoring
benefits and savings, the executive order does a disservice to Congress and
to all citizens.
The Public Citizen lawsuit highlights three fatal infirmities in the executive
order. First, regulatory reductions cannot be done indiscriminately because
the benefits of established constitutional law cannot be eliminated without
the full exposure to agency and judicial review as required by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Motor Vehicle Mtrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983). Second, agencies are required to honor enabling legislation and
carry out congressional instructions. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007), for example, the Supreme Court rejected the assertion by the Bush
administration’s Environmental Protection Agency that it lacked the
authority to address carbon pollution affecting climate change. If Congress
directs an agency to act, then it must act. Third, government must act for the
public benefit. These constitutional and political obligations are not only
ignored, they are affirmatively and aggressively rejected by the executive
order.
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A History of Government Benefits

Even the fight
between
Hamiltonians and
Jeffersonians
about the proper
role of
government was
not a fight about
the wisdom of
government
regulation; it was
a fight about its
proper locus.

In 1789, the first Congress of the United States passed 26 statutes that were
signed into law by President George Washington.14 Of those 26 laws, 20
dealt with the establishment of the executive branch and with government
regulations regarding import duties, lighthouses, vessels, and pensions. The
remaining laws addressed governance issues such as treaties with Native
Americans, the Northwest Territories, and payments to the states. In brief,
and as amply demonstrated by Yale legal historian Jerry Mashaw,15 the
United States has always had a regulatory function implemented by
administrative agencies, and those functions were exercised for the public
good.
To be sure, the United States has gone through several regulatory cycles,
from mercantilism to laissez-faire capitalism and from progressivism to
deregulation. During those cycles, the issue was never about the presence or
absence of regulation. Instead, the central issue was how to use government
regulation to maximize the common good, to maximize social benefits.
Indeed, defining the public interest has always been open to political debate
and deliberation. Yet, even the fight between Hamiltonians and
Jeffersonians about the proper role of government was not a fight about the
wisdom of government regulation; it was a fight about its proper locus.
Hamilton believed a central government was necessary so the newly formed
United States could play on the world’s economic stage. Jefferson believed
an agrarian society could best protect individual liberty. Both, however, were
committed to using regulation for the commonweal. This regulatory and
mercantilist commitment was later dubbed the American System by Henry
Clay; a system that established a three-pronged national economic policy of
government support for infrastructure, nascent industries, and fiscal
controls. In short, the American System was a system based on government
regulation.16
Political and legal scholars, as well as economists, regularly debate the
wisdom of one form of regulation or another. Whether it involved protecting
corporate charters in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) or
granting or withholding monopolies in Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837), the fundamental issue is that regulation is
grounded in the public interest as a matter of constitutional law. In
Dartmouth College, Chief Justice John Marshall explicitly noted that the
corporate charter involved in that case was deemed “beneficial to the
country.” 17 U.S at 638. Similarly, in Charles River Bridge, Chief Justice Roger
Taney established a rule of construction that required statutes to be
construed “in favor of the public.” 36 U.S. at 544. At no time in U.S. history
has the Court condoned the arbitrary and capricious elimination of
regulations intended to benefit the public interest.
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As legal historian Herbert Hovenkamp has written, “American governments
have always been involved in economic development and the creation of
infrastructure, although both the amount and nature of the involvement
change over time.”17 Of particular note is the fact that with Andrew Jackson’s
election, government economic policy and regulation shifted from
mercantilism to laissez-faire. The shift to such an economic policy lessened
federal government intervention, but it did not eliminate it. Jacksonian
populism was aimed at federal corruption, and he looked to the states to
protect economic liberty. In response to Jacksonian concerns, to ensure
against cronyism and legislative capture, the Supreme Court explicitly
articulated a public use test for regulatory activity. Loan Association v.
Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874) (taxation); United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry.
Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (takings). The public use requirement means that
government action should be intended to generate public benefits.
By the mid-19th century, the U.S. economy was evolving rapidly through
northern migration, immigration, urbanization, and, most importantly,
industrialization. One dramatic consequence of all of those trends was that
corporate concentration began to have negative effects on the economy
and on the citizenry. Increased economic inequality led to the Gilded Age,
increased poverty and illness, and increased risks to consumers. These
trends, in turn, had the pernicious effect of creating an economic underclass
that felt powerless to combat growing social and economic ills. In response,
a new form of countervailing power was needed to balance industrial
strength. The federal government was seen as the institution to
counterbalance private power, to protect markets from abuse, and to relieve
citizen suffering.
By way of example, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) is generally
considered to be the first modern administrative law case, and it
demonstrates the power of government to correct market abuses. Shortly
thereafter, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was created in 1887
as the first modern administrative agency. These two developments
emphasize the combined role of Congress and the executive branch in
adopting and implementing public-regarding regulatory initiatives.

Munn is significant precisely for setting out the contours for modern
regulation. At issue in the case was an Illinois statute setting the prices for
grain elevators because they were exercising both monopoly and
monopsony power. Farmers who sold grain to the elevators were underpaid,
and consumers who bought that grain paid too much for it because of the
market power exercised by the elevators. In reviewing the constitutionality
of the Illinois legislation, the Supreme Court established two principles for
modern regulation. First, the Court recognized that governments have long
regulated industries that exercised monopoly power, even to the point of
allowing government to set a private firm’s prices. In short, the first element
necessary before a regulation is adopted is to identify a market failure.
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Second, the subject to be regulated must be determined to be in the public
interest. In Munn, the Court acknowledged that setting fair and reasonable
grain prices in the country’s breadbasket was clearly in the public interest.
The ICC complemented the regulatory principles of Munn. The agency was
created to monitor abuses of railroad rates. It was seen as an institution that
was nonpolitical, expert, technically proficient, and could correct economic
dislocations. After the creation of the ICC, and in response to corporate and
industrial concentration, similar legislation was passed to correct for the
abuses of monopoly power (Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Pub. L. No. 26 Stat. 209
and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717); provide for
hydropower (the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063); address airline safety (the
Air Commerce Act of 192 6, 44 Stat. 568); and the like.

Agencies were
seen as
technically
proficient expert
administrators
that were tasked
by Congress to
address social
and economic
problems in the
public interest
and for the
benefit of all.

This legislation led to the establishment of administrative agencies including
the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Federal Power Commission, and others. These agencies, like the ICC before
them, were seen as technically proficient expert administrators that were
tasked by Congress to address social and economic problems in the public
interest and for the benefit of all. In addition to market corrections, agencies
were also created to protect citizens from social harms. Congress specifically
identified problems such as tainted meat (the Federal Meat Inspection Act of
1906, 34 Stat. 1256) and adulterated food and drugs (the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1096, 34 Stat. 768) and passed legislation to provide
government protection from those dangers.
All of this legislative and administrative activity took place before the
proliferation of New Deal and Great Society agencies. The New Deal and the
Great Society created new sets of agencies and expanded the scope and
reach of government. Although they were directed to address different sets
of problems, both were created in the public interest and directed to
advance the public benefit. New Deal economic legislation was intended to
accomplish three things — develop a national infrastructure, particularly in
energy (the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 847, and the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat.
821); regulate and stabilize markets, particularly though disclosure and
financial reporting (Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881); and promote and support a middle
class, particularly through the creation of safety nets and by empowering
labor organizations (Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, and the
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449), among other legislation.
Rather than focusing on economy-wide reforms, Great Society legislation
was directed at solving social problems, especially those affecting health,
safety, and welfare. Most notably, the Great Society directed attention to
and the federal protection of civil rights (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
241, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437). Additionally, legislation
of that period addressed problems of the environment (National
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Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852), worker safety (Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 84 Stat. 1590), consumer protection (Consumer
Product Safety Act, 81 Stat. 466), and poverty (Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, 78 Stat. 508). What distinguishes the New Deal from the Great Society,
then, is that New Deal legislation and agencies buoyed the economy while
Great Society legislation and agencies improved social welfare.
In both instances, new agencies were created and new regulations were
adopted to implement legislation intended to generate public benefits. In
each case, the legislation was expressly directed to serving the “public
interest” in general or individual statutes identified a more specific public
interest such as preventing racial discrimination, fighting poverty, protecting
workers, or preserving the environment.
Any legal transition comes with some costs as clearly articulated by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922):
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law.” Holmes’ argument is that regulation in the public interest
can impose costs on select private individuals in exchange for overall
benefits to society. More significantly, however, those costs are imposed on
those actors who caused social harms. Regulation, as Holmes knew, is based
on a principle of cost causation.

By its very terms,
the order is
directed to
protecting
“private
expenditures” at
the expense of
public benefits.

The reality of regulation is that regulations do not indiscriminately impose
costs on blameless actors. Regulations protecting children from lead
poisoning may well impose costs; so do clean air regulations directed to
power plants to reduce greenhouse gas pollution. However, those
compliance costs are imposed on the culpable; they require bad actors to
account for the harms that they have inflicted on the public. Regulation,
then, is intended to avoid those harms in the first place rather than impose
them on innocent persons. Polluter profits should not be made at the
expense of citizen asthma or heart disease.18 Regulation or its reduction is
not intended to reward malfeasants; it is intended to provide compensation,
avoid harm, and promote public welfare.
The executive order at issue does exactly the opposite. By its very terms, the
order is directed to protecting “private expenditures” at the expense of
public benefits. The order should be struck down because by neglecting
benefits, it contravenes the political history and constitutional values of the
United States.
Protecting Market and Nonmarket Values through Regulation
After the spate of New Deal economic regulation, policymakers perceived a
need for uniformity among agency procedures. In order to bring that
uniformity, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 60
Stat. 237. Then, after the passage of Great Society social legislation,
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administrative law scholars and economists sought uniformity among
substantive agency actions.
The work of economist Alfred Kahn19 and Justice Stephen Breyer20
responded to that call for regulatory uniformity. Both authors identified a
model of regulation that was based on a straightforward and simple idea.
Government regulation had been and should be used to correct market
failures. Most often, those failures resulted from economic dislocations in
malfunctioning or inefficient markets. The same principles of market failure,
though, also apply to nonmarket values. Individuals can be disadvantaged
as a result of an unfair economic distribution or as a result of illegitimate
discrimination. Government regulation, then, can be used to correct market
failures, and it can be used to protect nonmarket values such as civil and
political rights and liberties.21
Regulation can address cases of both market and nonmarket failures, and
the goal of that regulation, as leading regulatory casebooks demonstrate, is
to further public benefits either by reducing harms or by providing publicly
valuable goods and services. Economic regulation is design to promote
economy-wide efficiency, and social regulation is designed to promote
nationwide fairness and equality.22 Both approaches, economic and social,
are intended to improve the lives of the citizenry and to enable them to
participate in political and economic markets. Such participation advances
our democracy.
There is regulation at every level of government, and its scope is ubiquitous.
It touches our lives, from federal and local taxes to environmental rules and
regulations, and from local school requirements to interstate oil pipelines.
Despite the ubiquity, however, government intervenes in private markets for
only a handful of reasons, and it uses only a handful of regulatory tools to do
so.
By way of example, regulations are used to assure the public that services
are safe and reliable and that assurance can be given through licensing.
Licenses, in turn, can be used to certify lawyers, doctors, and other
professionals, and licenses can be used to market potentially dangerous
drugs or even authorize a nuclear power plant to generate electricity.
As other examples, to the extent that a market may be subject to
monopolization, regulations can ensure that electricity and gas prices are
fair and reasonable through ratemaking. To the extent that as consumers,
we lack information about drugs or about what is contained in the foods we
eat, then regulations can require that information be provided to better
inform our consumer choices.
The simple point is that as varied and as extensive as government regulation
is, there are only a limited number of regulatory tools, and they are all
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intended to either improve economic markets or protect us from either
economic harm or other from forms of disadvantages and social pain.
Regulations are not intended to protect private expenditures alone; they are
intended to promote the public good.

Counting Regulatory Benefits
The growth of the regulatory state raised concerns on both sides of the
political aisle. Beginning with President Jimmy Carter’s administration,
politicians and policymakers began to question the extent of regulation and,
in fact, began to deregulate. The Carter administration deregulated airlines,
trucking, energy, and the financial sector, among others. The deregulatory
mood became more visible with the election of Ronald Reagan. During his
administration, deregulation continued, and the Regan Revolution became
synonymous with deregulation across the board.23
The deregulatory efforts of the Carter and Reagan presidencies, however, are
distinguishable. Carter’s deregulatory initiatives started with the proposition
that regulation should fix broken markets. If the cost of regulation exceeded
the benefits of the regulatory checks, then competitive markets were
preferable. However, if government regulation could improve efficiency,
then regulation was preferable to unconstrained markets. In short,
regulation under Carter assessed costs and benefits for the purpose of
promoting competition.
As noted, Reagan deregulated across the board. Instead of asking whether
or not regulation facilitated or inhibited competitive markets, Reagan’s
deregulation was based on an anti-government animus as revealed in such
slogans as “trickle-down economics,” and “don’t tax, don’t spend.” Those
simple slogans gave way to a more full-throated ideology known as
neoliberalism.
Neoliberalism was more concerned about the size, reach, and cost of
government than it was about competitive markets. It was based on two
principles: promote markets and demonize government. That neoliberal
spirit infuses the Trump executive order that is directed at regulatory cost
reduction in favor of free markets in name only.
The qualification about markets “in name only” is to indicate that there is no
such thing as a free market in a mixed market economy. Neoliberal
sloganeers proselytized as if there was a choice between “free markets” and
“big government.” This choice is as simplistic as it is wrong. Instead,
government involvement with markets is as extensive as it is necessary.
Government regulation can be seen in the common law baseline of
contracts, torts, and property law, and it can be seen in macroeconomic
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controls such as central banking and rules regarding the amount of credit
available at any one time.

Focusing on
regulatory costs
without
accounting for
benefits upsets
the balance
between
government and
markets and may
do so not only to
the detriment of
markets
themselves but
also to individual
lives.

In other words, the proper mix of government and markets generates
economic and social benefits. Focusing on regulatory costs without
accounting for benefits upsets the balance between government and
markets and may do so not only to the detriment of markets themselves, but
also to individual lives. Problematically, this narrow focus on costs is based
on flawed research and a fundamental analytic error.
The False Concern about Regulatory Costs
The concern, one might even say obsession, with regulatory costs has long
been a staple of government critics. Most notably, critics argue that
regulation costs the U.S. economy $2 trillion per year. That figure is based
upon a study prepared for the National Association of Manufacturers and
authored by two Lafayette College economists, Nicole C. Crain and W. Mark
Crain, who based their $2 trillion estimate by simply updating a previous
study.24 That previous study was widely cited by neoliberals both inside and
outside of government. Two glaring problems with the Crain & Crain analysis
render it defective.
First, the report relies on a “top-down” methodology for 75 percent of its
cost calculation rather than relying on the actual cost estimates used by
agencies. The methodology relies upon macroeconomic variables and
modeling techniques to measure the effect of regulation on the economy as
a whole.25
To reach their trillion dollar estimates, Crain & Crain used information from
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development to compare
national economies and to infer the cost of regulation from that information.
They employed a proxy measure of the amount of regulation based upon
the Global Competitive Index, which is a component of the Global
Competitiveness Report that measures various aspects of the institutions,
policies, and other factors to determine a country’s productivity level.
The cost comparisons from that report are based upon an Executive Opinion
Survey from which Crain & Crain extracted only three questions. They relied
upon responses to questions asking executives to comment on the burden
of government regulation, the efficiency of the legal framework used to
challenge regulation, and the regulation of a country’s securities exchanges.
Executives were asked to measure those indicia on a 1 to 7 point scale. Crain
& Crain then accumulated the survey results, determined mean values, ran
regression analyses, and, after using a hypothetical benchmark, concluded
that their findings were “statistically significant.”26 Regardless of that
conclusion, executive perception is a proxy data point; it is not based upon
accurate or actual empirical evidence.
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Official concerns were raised about the reliability of the report, including
one by the Office of Advocacy, the entity which granted the Crains the
contract for this research. The Office of Advocacy posted the report on its
website with the following caveat: “the findings of the study have been
taken out of context and certain theoretical estimates of costs have been
presented publicly as verifiable facts.”27 In addition to criticism by the Office
of Advocacy, the Congressional Research Service28 and the Government
Accountability Office29 also questioned the reliability of the Crain & Crain
analysis.
The second fatal flaw in the Crain & Crain analysis is even more damning.
They did not look at the economic value of regulatory benefits. By their own
admission, they failed to account for benefits because they were not asked
to do so.30 The Crain & Crain report may have fared better if it was based on
solid cost-benefit analysis.
The Importance of Regulatory Benefits
Since the Reagan administration, such influences as the law and economics
movement, neoliberalism or market liberalization, free market
fundamentalism, and the like have promoted quantitative analysis, more
specifically cost-benefit analysis, as a methodology to assess government
programs, reduce costs, and deregulate. Indeed, some scholars believe that
our administrative government constitutes a cost-benefit state, 31 although
our analysis need not take us that far.
The history and development of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is continuing,
and agencies have significant flexibility in how to use this methodology. It
must be noted and emphasized, however, that many, if not most,
environmental, health, and safety statutes direct agencies to use some
alternative such as feasibility or specific health or technology standards.
Since CBA was first used by the Army Corps of Engineers to evaluate which
public projects to pursue in the 1930s,32 through the development of
environmental economics, to current attempts to assess the value of human
life and calculate the current value of future benefits, CBA has had its
proponents as well as its critics.33 Regardless of the controversies
surrounding the application of CBA, two things are clear. First, CBA is now a
part of the regulatory state as a matter of administrative practice, executive
orders, and judicial decisions. Critically, though, there are many “kinds” of
CBA (i.e., CBA is a broad term that describes a wide variety of methodologies
for considering a rule’s costs and benefits and does not necessarily require
the conversion of all the rule’s costs and benefits into monetary values and
then directly balancing the two to find the economically “optimal” level of
regulation), and the type that agencies use will vary greatly depending on
the statute they are implementing. Indeed, as explained, the Supreme Court
has consistently endorsed the notion that agencies retain a great detail of
discretion in determining how to perform CBA for particular rules.

The Twin Demons of the Trump-Bannon Assault on Democracy | 17

Second, exactly as its name indicates, CBA involves the consideration of both
a rule’s costs and benefits, and the failure to consider either renders the
methodology meaningless. Yet, the executive order on reducing regulatory
costs conspicuously departs from this approach by focusing exclusively on
costs without addressing benefits.34 To be sure, since the executive order’s
issuance, OIRA, which is taking the lead in overseeing agency compliance
with the order’s requirements, has published guidance that instructs
agencies to continue subjecting their new rules as well as the repealed ones
to CBA.35 This guidance, however, directly contradicts the cost-only focus of
the executive order, which raises significant questions of whether and to
what extent agencies would be able to take it seriously when attempting to
comply with the order.)

The Supreme
Court generally
regards some
form of agency
consideration of
regulatory costs
and benefits to
be part of a
rational decisionmaking process,
though it has
been careful to
leave the precise
manner to the
discretion of the
rulemaking
agencies.

The executive branch has relied on CBA as a principal assessment tool for
over 40 years. President Reagan, with Executive Orders 12291 and 12498,
required agencies to utilize CBA and to issue an annual regulatory plan for
review by the Office of Management and Budget. President Bill Clinton,
through Executive Order 12866, and President Barack Obama, through
Executive Order 13563, adopted the essential features of the earlier CBA
orders and required agencies to assess both costs and benefits of regulation
and to proceed with them only when benefits “justify” the regulatory costs.
Questions about the proper scope and application of CBA, however, remain,
and those questions continue to be addressed by the judiciary. In short,
though, the direction is clear. Subject to statutory limitations, the Supreme
Court generally regards some form of agency consideration of regulatory
costs and benefits to be part of a rational decision-making process, though it
has been careful to leave the precise manner in which this consideration
takes place to the discretion of the rulemaking agencies. Significantly, even
while endorsing this discretion, Justices across the political spectrum
continue to maintain a presumption against the use of the most formal
approach to CBA, which involves the attempt to quantify and monetize all
regulatory costs and benefits and then to precisely balance those monetized
costs and benefits to identify the level of regulatory stringency that achieves
social optimality.36
The key to understanding the permissible use of CBA starts with the statute.
A statute can require or permit some form of CBA or it may limit its
application. Where the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue — which is
the bulk of the cases — the agency retains considerable discretion over how
costs and benefits are assessed and considered.
The central case for limiting an agency’s use of CBA is American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). The Court was
asked to decide whether the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) needed to cost-justify a cotton dust regulation. Enabling legislation
directs OSHA to establish standards for toxic materials “which most
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adequately ensures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity.” 29 U.S.C §655(b)(5)
(2012). The Court rejected the use of CBA as inconsistent with that statutory
requirement:
“[C]ongress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits,
by placing the ‘benefit’ of worker health above all other considerations save
those making the attainment of this ‘benefit’ unachievable. Any standard
based on a balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a
different balance than that struck by Congress inconsistent with the
command set forth in §6 (b) (5). Thus, cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not
required by the statute because feasibility analysis is.” 427 U.S. at 509.

American Textile remains good law and its significance to the executive
order must be underscored. Specifically, Congress can require an agency to
regulate according to a standard other than formal, economic CBA. Most
importantly, that standard is one that serves the public interest and not the
interest of any private industry or concern.
Since American Textile, the Court has addressed other CBA issues
particularly relevant to environmental regulation. The strongest statement
regarding a limitation on CBA comes from Justice Scalia in Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001), a case dealing with the
Clean Air Act. Pursuant to the act, the EPA administrator is required to set
ambient air standards for certain common air pollutants. The industry
argued that when reviewing or revising standards, the administrator must
consider costs. Justice Scalia rejected that argument:
“Section 109(b)(1) instructs the EPA to set primary ambient air quality
standards ‘the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are requisite to
protect the public health’ with ‘an adequate margin of safety.’ [O]ne would
have thought it fairly clear that this text does not permit the EPA to consider
costs in setting the standards. . . . Nowhere are the costs of achieving such a
standard made part of that initial decision.” 531 U.S. at 465.
Again, the point should be clear. When a statute sets out public benefits as
the determinative decision-making criterion, then costs are not to be
considered. Consequently, for those statutes that specify regulatory
standards that forbid consideration of costs, then the singular focus on
regulatory costs of the executive order directly violates Supreme Court
rulings.
Since American Trucking, the Court has provided agencies with additional
guidance on the use of CBA and the consideration of regulatory costs
consistent with different statutory mandates. The essential thrust of these
cases is that where not specifically prohibited by law, agencies generally
must undertake some assessment of costs and benefits as part of their
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regulatory decision-making, though the manner in which this consideration
is undertaken is committed to agency discretion. Notably, though, the Court
has indicated one potential caveat to this broader grant of discretion —
namely, it has consistently expressed a strong skepticism of the kind of
formal CBA endorsed by neoliberal economists, preferring instead more
informal approaches to measuring and comparing a rule’s advantages and
disadvantages.
In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009), for example, the
EPA declined to require the use of a particular technology for cooling power
plants because of its expense. The statute required that a regulation reflect
the “best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact,” Clean Water Act §316(b), 33 U.S.C. §1326(b) (2012). Justice Scalia
noted that the enabling legislation did not “tie the agency’s hands as to
whether cost-benefit analysis should be used.”
Justice Scalia then distinguished American Textile and American Trucking
and ruled that if the statute is silent about CBA, that does not mean that an
agency is not permitted to use it. He did, however, make it clear that the
Court might well take a different view were the agency to engage in a more
formal cost-benefit analysis, noting that more “rigorous form[s] of costeffective benefit analysis” might be “preclude[d].” 556 U.S. 223; see also at
235 (Breyer, J. concurring) (“The EPA’s reading of the statute seems to permit
it to describe environmental benefits in non-monetized terms and to
evaluate both costs and benefits in accordance with its expert judgment and
scientific knowledge. The Agency can thereby avoid lengthy formal costbenefit proceedings and futile attempts at comprehensive monetization
[and] take account of Congress’ technology-forcing objectives.”)

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S.Ct. 1584 (2014) is in accord. In
that case, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, ruled that the EPA
may consider costs along with benefits in setting rules regarding interstate
air pollution for the express intent of improving air quality across state
borders thus generating health benefits.
The most recent and most significant case to weigh in on agency use of CBA
is Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). The Court was asked to review EPA
regulations limiting toxic emissions from power plants. The EPA determined
that given a statutory ambiguity, it was not required to consider costs in
making a threshold determination about whether to limit the toxic
emissions, but later incorporated cost considerations into its final
determination of how to set the actual limits on the toxic air pollutants.
In the opinion for a 5-4 Court, Justice Scalia wrote that it is not “even
rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of dollars of economic
costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.”135 S.
Ct. at 2707. In dissent, Justice Kagan argued that the EPA had adequately
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considered costs, just at the second step in its two-step decision-making
process. Regarding that aspect of the agency’s decision-making, she wrote
that “[c]ost is almost always a relevant — and usually, a highly important —
factor in regulation.” 135 S. Ct. at 2716-17. The important point to emphasize
is that cost considerations are weighed against beneficial ones. In other
words, an agency’s consideration of costs does not occur in a vacuum.
Instead, cost considerations occur with a thorough and detailed
consideration of public benefits, which constitutes the very purpose of the
statute. Indeed, the EPA finding in that case was based on an 800-page
report that cataloged the public health harms caused by power plant
emissions of mercury and other toxic air pollutants.
In Michigan v. EPA, both Justice Scalia and Justice Kagan recognized that the
EPA was obliged to consider costs and benefits. Most importantly, though,
Justice Scalia wrote that while an agency had to account for costs in some
way, “a formal cost- benefit analysis in which each advantage and
disadvantage is assigned a monetary value” was not required (135 S. Ct. at
2711). Thus the majority and the dissent determined that the manner in
which the costs must be weighed against the benefits should be left to the
discretion of the EPA, while both Justices indicated their skepticism about
the use of formal CBA.
Although open issues remain concerning the use of CBA, there is universal
agreement about its application when it is used to assess regulations: Costs
and benefits must be weighed against each other in some manner. Benefits
cannot be ignored because benefits matter; they matter in promoting the
public interest as identified by Congress. Such consideration of benefits and
concern for the public interest is ignored by the executive order and,
therefore, it is constitutionally infirm.
To complete the point, it must be added that by ignoring benefits, not only
is the will of Congress ignored but with it so is the public interest and the
public good of the country because regulations produce public benefits.37
Benefits Matter as a Matter of Law and as a Matter of Good Policy
The executive order mandating the elimination of two regulations for every
new one adopted without considering benefits is an extreme form of what is
known as the “pay-go” approach to regulation, an approach that the Center
for Progressive Reform has criticized in the past.38 In the “pay-go” approach,
there can be a 1-to-1, 2-to-1, or even 3-to-1 trade-off between old and new
regulations. In other words, for every one new regulation, one or two or
three old ones must be eliminated as cost-reduction measures. However, if
the focus is exclusively on costs, then such an approach is something that
law and policy do not allow.
In contrast to past efforts at so-called regulatory reform, the objective of a
cost-only pay-go approach is not to improve the quality of individual
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regulatory decisions, but rather to put an arbitrary cap on the total amount
of regulation through the establishment of a regulatory budget. However,
regulatory budgets can constrain agencies and impede their ability to carry
out congressional directives at the risk of increasing public harm.39 The
executive order has the same intent; it also has the same defect in that
benefits are ignored when calculating the trade-offs. Some countries, such
as the United Kingdom and Australia, have adopted “pay-go” that does not
completely ignore benefits.40 Instead, they measure “net direct costs,” that is,
the remaining costs imposed on businesses after all the benefits that the
regulation provides those businesses have been subtracted out. Of course, it
is easy to argue that regulations are too burdensome and they should be
reduced. Paperwork and reporting requirements, as examples, as well as
reducing the amount of time spent in regulatory review can reduce
regulatory costs with little or no impact on benefits delivered. Unfortunately,
the executive order is not limited to paperwork reduction or to streamlining
regulatory processes. Rather, given the rhetoric surrounding the signing of
the executive order, substantive regulations, most notably environmental
regulations, are the targets.41
The importance of regulatory benefits must be underscored.42 OMB, for
example, estimates that regulatory benefits exceed regulatory costs by 7-to1 for significant regulations,43 and that for 2014, the total costs of federal
regulation ranged from between $68.5 to $101.8 billion while total benefits
ranged from $261.7 to $1,042.1 billion.44 The EPA estimates that the
regulatory benefits of the Clean Air Act exceed costs by a 25-to-1 ratio,45 and
another EPA study found that regulatory benefits exceeded costs by ratios
as high as 22-to-1.46 And, as noted earlier, the Congressional Research
Service is in accord with the EPA’s positive assessment of regulation.47 By
way of simple example, the EPA estimates that vehicle fuel standards will
provide net benefits to society estimated at $100 billion.48
Just as the benefits of regulation must be acknowledged, the costs of failing
to regulate properly or not regulate at all are a matter of life and death.
Simply consider that the BP Deepwater Horizon49 and the Upper Big Branch
Mine disasters50 and the Big Short mortgage debacle51 have all been
attributed to the failure to regulate; they were not attributable to overregulation. And they cost society considerably.
Most harshly, the failure to regulate has resulted in the privatization of
benefits and the socialization of costs. Homeowners, not bankers, suffered
the most severe losses due to the lack of financial regulation, and mine
workers and oil and gas workers, not CEOs, lost their lives for the failure to
aggressively pursue safety regulations. Indeed, while one coal mine owner
was sentenced to a meager year in prison for persistently failing to address
hazardous conditions that led to the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster that
cost the lives of 29 workers,52 other CEOs escaped any sanction at all53 and
their companies thrived. The bank executives who were responsible for
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bringing the world economy to the brink of a global depression were
rewarded with bonuses, and their banks have never been richer. Something
is wrong with a society that tolerates such injustice, and that is the type of
society that will be perpetuated, not reversed, by the executive order.

Conclusion
The Trump administration’s two main deregulatory executive orders have
the reasonable goal of reducing regulatory costs. Their devilish methods of
doing so, however, are fraught with difficulties, and the difficulties are
literally fatal. The regulatory review measures of Demon 1 threaten to
collapse the regulatory process by micromanagement, and the regulatory
cost-reduction measures of Demon 2 threaten to extract valuable benefits
from good government regulation. These twin threats raise risks to our lives
as well as to the economy as a whole.
As troubling as the so-called regulatory reforms and the cost-cutting
measures are, even more troubling is the reality that the regulatory cuts will
be used politically to advance the Trump administration’s social agenda. The
reforms and the cuts will not be used for the economic benefit of the United
States let alone for the benefit of all of its citizens. Instead, the reforms and
the cuts will be visited on those least in a position to protect themselves.
Consider actions already taken and contemplated:


Reducing protections for transgender students54 and consumers;55



Eliminating environmental protections generally;56



Reversing the Obama’s administration’s clean energy efforts more
specifically;57



Even more specifically, withdrawing the United States from the
international Paris Climate Agreement signed by nearly 200
countries;58



Aggressively ignoring science to the benefit of insecticide
manufacturers;59



Arrogantly ignoring forensic science in the Department of Justice;60



Defunding legal services61 and the arts;62



Fouling streams and endangering drinking water;63



Rolling back privacy protections by the FCC;64
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The Attorney General’s skepticism about official reports of police
racism;65



Overturning the Obama administration’s gun restrictions for the
mentally ill;66



Pursuing an immigration ban unrelated to any identified harms;67



Promoting inhumane private prisons;68



Demonizing the media as the enemy of the people;69



Reducing privacy rights for citizens70 and non-citizens;71 reducing
healthcare coverage while raising healthcare prices;72



Halting investigations of methane leaks73 and efforts to promote
competition in the communications industry;74



Financing private charter schools at the expense of public
education;75 and,



Most insipidly and hatefully, building a multi-billion dollar spite
fence,76 among other actions.

Instead of issuing executive orders that ignore constitutional and statutory
requirements and run contrary to good government practices and policies,
the Trump administration, and other presidential administrations to follow,
should identify reforms that will strengthen the regulatory system so that
executive agencies are better able to carry out their missions of protecting
people and the environment.
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